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Abstract. This article revisits side-channel analysis from the standpoint of
coding theory. On the one hand, the attacker is shown to apply an optimal
decoding algorithm in order to recover the secret key from the analysis of the
side-channel. On the other hand, the side-channel protections are presented as
a coding problem where the information is mixed with randomness to weaken
as much as possible the sensitive information leaked into the side-channel.
Therefore, the field of side-channel analysis is viewed as a struggle between
a coder and a decoder. In this paper, we focus on the main results obtained
through this analysis. In terms of attacks, we discuss optimal strategy in
various practical contexts, such as type of noise, dimensionality of the leakage
and of the model, etc. Regarding countermeasures, we give a formal analysis
of some masking schemes, including enhancements based on codes contributed
via fruitful collaborations with Claude Carlet.
1 Introduction
Digital information is handled by electronic devices, such as smartphones or
servers. Some information, such as keys, is sensitive, in the sense that it shall
remain confidential. In general, information is present in three states within
devices: at rest, in transit, and in computation. The protection of information at
rest can be ensured by on-chip encryption in the memories. The same technique
applies to the data in transit: the buses can be encrypted (e.g., in a lightweight
way, in which case one uses the term scrambling). Therefore, the protection of
information during computation is the big issue to be dealt with. It is a real
challenge, as a computing devices inadvertently leak some information about
the data they manipulate. In this context, three questions are of interest:
1. How does an attacker best exploit the leaked information? The situation is
similar to that of a decoding problem, and one aims at finding the optimal
decoder.
2. Second, the designer (and the end user) aim at being protected against
such attacks. Their goal is thus to try and weaken the side-channel. Ran-
domization is one option, referred to as masking in the literature. We will
illustrate that it can be seen as the use of code to optimally mix some
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random bits into the computations, with the possibility to eventually get
rid off this entropy, e.g., at the end of the computation. Another interesting
usage of codes is to detect faults in circuits. This dual use of codes is of
interest in general security settings, where attacks can choose to be either
passive or active. It is also very relevant in the case the circuit is trapped
with a Hardware Trojan Horse.
3. Third, it is interesting to know in which respect the circuit leakage favors
or not attacks. In particular, we will investigate the effect of glitches as
a threat to masking schemes.
Outline. We start with the adversarial strategies in Sec. 2. Protection strate-
gies, especially masking, are presented in Sec. 3. We will show how the circuit
itself can contribute to the attack, through the analysis of glitches, in Sec. 4.
Conclusions are in Sec. 5. Eventually, appendix A gives some computation
evidences why masking protection can be seen as reducing the signal-to-noise
ratio, by increasing the noise.
2 Side-channel Analysis as a Decoding Problem
In this section, we first describe the setup and the objective of the attacker.
Second, we solve the objective of the attacker in various different setups.
2.1 Setup
We assume the device manipulates some data known by the attacker, such as a
plaintext or a ciphertext, called T . This data is mixed with some secret, say a
key k∗. The attacker manages to capture some noisy function of T and k∗, and
attempts to extract k∗. For this purpose, he will enumerate (manageable) parts
of the key (e.g., bytes), denoted k, and choose the key candidate k̂ which is the
most likely. Therefore, the attack resembles a communication channel, where
the input is k∗ and the output is k̂. The attack is termed successful if k̂=k∗.
Two kinds of leakage models are realistic in practice:
1. direct probing model, where the attacker uses some kind of probes, each
being able to measure one bit,
2. indirect measurement of an aggregated function of the bits, using for
instance an electromagnetic probe.
These two ways of capturing the signal are, by nature, very different. They
are illustrated in Fig. 1.
The first one is noiseless. However, the bits in integrated circuits are
nanometric, whereas probes are mesometric. Therefore, only few such probes
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(a) probing model (b) bounded-moments model
Fig. 1. Settings for side-channel analysis. In the probing model (a), a few bits (here, d=3)
are measured with dedicated probes. In the bounded moments model (b), the attacker
measures an integrated quantity of several bits.
can be used simultaneously. The security parameter is thus linked to the ability
for the attacker to recover some useful information out of d probes (where d
is typically 1, 2, 3 or 4). Besides, the probing requires a physical access to the
wires, which is challenging, since it is possible that the contact breaks the bit to
be probed. Such attack is termed semi-invasive, since it leaves an evidence that
the circuit has been tampered with (an opening is necessity to insert the probe).
The second one is noisy and also leaks some function of the bits. Therefore,
the attacker needs to capture more than one trace to extract some information.
This is why we model, in the sequel, traces by random variables. By convention,
the variables are printed with capital letters, such as X, when designating
a random variable, and with small letters, such as x, when designating the
realization of random variables. We also denote by Q the number of queries
(= of measurements), and by x=(x1,...,xQ) the vector of measurements. This
attack will require a statistical analysis, which in general consists in the study
of the leakage probability distribution. This starts in general by the analysis
of the leakage moments.
We will link the two models in the case of RSM countermeasure (Sec. 3.5).
The next section 2.2 discusses the channel k?→ k̂, for the second case.
2.2 Example of AWGN Channel
The key recovery setup is illustrated in Fig. 2 (see Fig. 1 in [24]). When the
noise is Gaussian and independent from one measurement to others, it is
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Fig. 2. Side-channel analysis as a communication channel
referred to as AWGN (Additive white Gaussian noise). We write:
X=y(T,k∗)+N, where N∼N (0,σ2). (1)
The random variable y(T,k∗) is the aggregated leakage model, and N is the
noise (independent from Y ). Let n the bitwidth of the key k and of the texts
T . The function y :Fn2×Fn2→R is, in practice, the composition two functions
y=ϕ◦f, where:
– f is an algorithmic function called sensitive variable, such as f(T,k∗)=
S(T⊕k∗), where S is a substitution box, and
– ϕ :Fn2→R accounts for the way the sensitive variable leaks, such as the
Hamming weight ϕ :z 7→wH(z)=
∑n
i=1zi.
2.3 Absence of Countermeasures
The optimal distinguisher is the key guess k̂ which maximizes the success
probability, that is the probability that k̂ is actually k∗.
When there is no protection, all the uncertainty resides in the measurement
noise. Thus, as the attacker knows T , he also knows Y =Y (T,k) (for all key
guess k).
Theorem 1 ([24, Thm. 4]). In the AWGN setup, the optimal distinguisher
is demonstrated to be equal to:
Dopt(x,t)=argmink‖x−y(t,k)‖22=argmaxk〈x|y(t,k)〉−
1
2
‖y(t,k)‖22, (2)
where ‖·‖2 is the Euclidean norm and 〈·|·〉 is the canonical scalar product.
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2.4 Multivariate and Multimodel Setting
In the multivariate and multimodel case, the attacker is able to collect:
– not only one sample, but D (dimensionality) samples, and
– each function of the bits (e.g., z 7→ 1, z 7→ zi for 1≤ i≤n, but also any
selection of z 7→∧i∈Izi where I⊆Fn2) has a different contribution.
We call S the number of models, and α the D×S matrix of the leakages, such
that Eqn. (1) is generalized as:
X=αy(T,k∗)+N, where N∼N (0,Σ), (3)
whereN is multivariate normal ofD×D covariance matrixΣ, andY=y(T,k∗)
is set of S models (e.g., S=1 if the leakage model is the Hamming weight,
or S=n+1 if there is a non-zero offset (such offset is modeled by z 7→1) and
each bit 1≤ i≤ n of the leakage model leaks differently). In this case also,
boldface variables are vectorial (either multivariate or multimodel).
We have a generalization of Theorem 1:
Theorem 2 ([7, Thm. 1]). Let us define x′ =Σ−1/2x and α′ =Σ−1/2α.
Then, in the multivariate and multimodel AWGN setup, the optimal distin-
guisher is demonstrated to be equal to:
DD,Sopt (x,t)=argmink
D∑
d=1
‖x′d−α′dy((t,k)‖22
=argmaxk tr
(
x′
(
α′y(t,k)
)T)−1
2
∥∥α′y(t,k)
∥∥2
F
,
where tr(·) is the trace operator of a square matrix and ‖ · ‖F is the Frobenius
normal of a (rectangular) matrix.
2.5 Collision
In some situations, the attacker does not know the leakage function y=ϕ◦f,
but knows that it is reused several times for different bytes, say L>1. We
denote by x(·)=(x(1),...,x(`),...,x(L)) the L leakages. Therefore, the optimal
attack consists in a collision attack where all the coefficients of the leakage
function are regressed.
Theorem 3 ([5, Thm. 2.5]). The optimal collision attack is:
DLopt(x(·),t(·))=argmaxk(·)∈(Fn2 )L
∑
u∈Fn2
(∑
`
∑
q/t
(`)
q ⊕k(`)=u
x
(`)
q
)2
∑
`
∑
q/t
(`)
q ⊕k(`)=u
1
.
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Notice that in general, this attack allows to recover (L−1) n-bit keys when
the collision is involving L samples with identical leakage model.
2.6 General Setting with Countermeasures
In general, the device defends itself, by the implementation of protections.
Masking (cf. Sec. 3.2) is one of them. In the expression of y, in addition to T
and k, another random variable M is introduced, called the mask, unknown
to the attacker. It is usually assumed that it is uniformly distributed.
Theorem 4 ([8, Proposition 8]). The optimal attack in case of masking
countermeasure is:
DM;Lopt (x(·),t(·))=argmaxk
Q∑
q=1
log
{∑
m
exp
{ D∑
d=1
1
σ(d)
2
(
x(d)q y
(d)
q −
1
2
y(d)q
2)}
}
,
assuming that the noise at each sample d is normal of variance σ(d)
2
.
2.7 Link Between Success Probability, SNR and Leakage Function
The optimal distinguishers Dopt given in various scenarios (Dopt for nominal
case in Sec. 2.3, DD,Sopt for multivariate and multimodel case in Sec. 2.3, DLopt
for the collision case in Sec. 2.5, and DM;Lopt for the masked case in Sec. 2.6)
allow to recover the secret key with the largest success rate (denoted as SR),
but do not help in predicting the number of traces to reach a given success
rate (or vice-versa).
Such relationship can be easily derived from the analysis of so-called first-
order exponents [23]. Let us denoteAopt(x,t,k) the argument of maximization
in either of Dopt, DD,Sopt , DLopt or DM;Lopt . We have:
Theorem 5 ([23, Corollary 1]).
1−SR(D)≈e−Q·SE(D) (4)
where the first-order success exponent SE(D) is equal to:
SE(D)= 1
2
min
k6=k∗
(
Aopt(x,t,k∗)−Aopt(x,t,k)
)2
Var
(
Aopt(x,t,k∗)−Aopt(x,t,k)
) . (5)
For the sake of the introduction of a signal-to-noise, we rewrite Eqn. (1) as:
X=αy(T,k∗)+N, where E(y(T,k∗))=0, Var(y(T,k∗))=1 and N∼N (0,σ2).
Let us introduce generalized confusion coefficients [20]:
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Definition 6 (General 2-way confusion coefficients [23, Def. 8 & 10]).
For k 6=k∗ we define
κ(k∗,k)=E
{(Y (k∗)−Y (k)
2
)2}
, (6)
κ′(k∗,k)=E
{(Y (k∗)−Y (k)
2
)4}
. (7)
For example, for the optimal distinguisher in the nominal case, the success
exponent expression is:
Lemma 7 (SE for the optimal distinguisher, [23, Proposition 5]). The
success exponent for the optimal distinguisher takes the closed-form expression
SE(Dopt)=
1
2
min
k6=k∗
α2κ2(k∗,k)
σ2κ(k∗,k)+α2(κ′(k∗,k)−κ(k∗,k)2 . (8)
This closed-form expression simplifies for high noise σα in a simple equation:
Corollary 8 ([23, Corollary 2]). For low SNR:
SE(Dopt) ≈
1
2
min
k 6=k∗
α2κ2(k∗,k)
σ2κ(k∗,k)
=
1
2
·SNR·min
k 6=k∗
κ(k∗,k), (9)
where SNR=α2/σ2 is the signal-to-noise ratio (see [6] for the definition of
SNR in the multivariate case).
3 Side-Channel Protection
Side-channel attacks threaten the security of cryptographic implementations.
Protections against such attacks can be devised using the coding theory. We
illustrate in this section several techniques which randomize leakages in a view
to decorrelate them from the internally manipulated data, and that (in some
cases) also allow to detect malicious fault injections.
3.1 Strategies to Thwart Side-Channel Attacks
As discussed in Sec. 2.7 (especially in (9)), the success of an attack is all the
larger as the leakage function has a higher confusion (6) and the SNR is high.
However, the input of confusion is limited, since 0≤mink 6=k∗κ(k∗,k)≤1/2 is
bounded. Moreover, the defender cannot always change the algorithm nor its
leakage model, that is mink 6=k∗κ(k∗,k) is fixed. Thus, the defender is better
off focusing on the reduction of the SNR.
This can be achieved in two flavors:
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1. reduce the signal, as done in strategies aiming at flattening the leakage.
This is easily achieved for some side-channels, such as timing: the execu-
tion time is made constant, e.g., by inserting dummy instructions or by
balancing the code in each branch when the control flow forks. However,
balancing an analogue quantity (such as power or electromagnetic field)
is more challenging, let alone because of process variations, two identical
gates or structures behave differently after fabrication. For instance, this
is the working factor of physically unclonable functions (PUFs). Therefore,
the quality of the protection depends on the ability of the fabrication plant
to produce reproducible patterns. This fact naturally limits the quality of
the designer’s work, hence does not encourage to reach very high levels
of security. In case this case, the second option is preferred;
2. increase the noise, by resorting to some extra random variables indepen-
dant of that involved in the leakage function. Obviously, some artificial
noise can be easily produced: one practical example consists in running
an algorithm known to produce a lot of leakage (such as an asymmetrical
engine, e.g., RSA) in parallel to the algorithm to protect. However, there
remains the risk that the attacker manages, by a subtle placement of the
probes, to limit or completely avoid the externally added noise; imagine an
attacker with a very selective electromagnetic probe which would place its
probe over the targetted algorithm, which is micrometers apart from the
noise source (RSA). Therefore, it sounds wiser to entangle the computation
and the random variables. This is what is achieved by so-called masking
schemes. Appendix A explains why masking reduces the SNR.
Notice that the two strategies are orthogonal, that is, it is beneficial to employ
them at the same time. Still, in the sequel, we will focus on masking, since
it allows (at least in theory) to increase the noise at the maximal extent.
3.2 Masking Schemes
Masking schemes have been introduced to obfuscate the internals of a com-
putation, in a view to make it more difficult to be attacked. The strategy in
masking is based on randomization:
– for data (e.g., in algorithms with constant-execution flow, such as AES), and
– for operations (e.g., in algorithms where the sequence of operations leak
some secrets, such as RSA).
In practice, a masking scheme consists in four algorithms, as depicted in Fig. 3.
Initially, the input data must be masked, thanks to a first algorithm. Second,
the masked data is manipulated, so as to implement the intended cryptographic
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Fig. 3. Masking schemes
operation. Many techniques exist. One way to envision masking is to see all
the operations making up the cryptographic function as look-up tables. In this
case, the masked look-up tables can be implemented as [38, Tab. 1]:
– new larger look-up tables, where the masking material is now part of the
addressing strategy,
– table recomputation specifically for the current mask, or
– computation style which is able to operate on masked data.
After the operation has been computed, it can be necessary to refresh the
masks. Indeed, if the value is intended to be used more than once, then
some masks would be duplicated during the computation. It is thus wise to
re-randomize the current masks. Eventually, at the end of the computation,
the masked data shall be freed from its mask. Hence a demasking step. The
first three algorithms require entropy, whereas the last one destroys entropy.
3.3 Security of Masking Schemes
It is easy to measure the amount of entropy consumed by a masking scheme (see
top of Fig. 3). However, this does not obviously reflect its actual security level.
Indeed, the entropy can be wasted, e.g., by being badly used: XORing together
entropy reduces it, while bringing no additional difficulty for the attacker.
The first attempt to measure security arise from [1, Definition 1]. The order
is defined as the minimum number of intermediate values an attacker must
collect to recover part of the secret. In this framework, the overall security is
that of the weakest link.
Still, the exact definition of an intermediate variable is unclear. The dif-
ficulty arises from the fact the designer would like to link the security to
properties of its design. However, the intermediate variables encompass differ-
ent notions depending on the refinement stage: after compilations, variables are
mapped to internal resources. Thus, the granularity [1, §3] can change between
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the cryptographic algorithm specification, the source code, the machine code,
and what is actually executed on the device.
Some early works considered intermediate values are bits, such as in private
circuits [26,25]. This makes sense for hardware circuits, for which (in general
CMOS processes) an equipotential has only two licit values, that is carries one
bit. However, private circuits have been extended to software implementations
(see e.g. [41]), where intermediate variables become bitvectors of the machine
word length. But after considering some new threats, such as glitches, a new
trend has consisted in looking back to bit-oriented masking. This is typically the
case of threshold implementations [36], where the granularity is again the bit.
In this article, we are interested with the lowest possible level of security
analysis, hence we consider that intermediate variables are bits.
3.4 Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking (ODSM): a Masking
Scheme Based on Codes
We illustrate in this section several masking schemes, and show in which
respect they relate to coding theory.
We will show that the two security notions related to masking (probing
and bounded-moment models) are equivalent when conducting analyses at
bit-level. We model a circuit as a parallel composition of bits, seen as elements
of F2. The exemple, when there are n wires in the circuit, we model the circuit
state as an element of Fn2 , that is the Cartesian product F2×...×F2.
At this stage, we use the following new notations. LetX a k-bit information
word to be concealed. Let Y an (n−k)-bit mask used to protect X. The
protected variable is Z=XG+YH, where:
• G is an k×n generating matrix of a code,
• H is an (n−k)×n generating matrix of a code of dual distance d+1,
• + is the bitwise addition in Fn2 , sometimes also denoted by ⊕.
The random variable YH is the mask. In practice, the bits making up Z
can be manipulated in whatever order, i.e., they can even be scheduled to be
manipulated one after the other, like in a bitslice implementation. We call Z
an encoding with codes, or ODSM [3].
Then, we have the following twain theorems.
Theorem 9. Encoding with codes is secure against probing of order d.
Proof. By definition of a code of dual distance d+1, any tuple of less than
d coordinates is uniformly distributed [9]. Thus, if the attacker probes up to
d (inclusive) wires, this word seen as an element of Fd2 is perfectly masked.
Therefore, no information on X can be recovered. ut
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Theorem 10 (Masking with codes is d-th order secure in the bounded-
moments model). For all pseudo-Boolean function ψ : Fn2 → R (leakage
function, denoted y=ϕ◦f in Sec. 2.2) of degree d◦(ψ)≤d, we have
Var(E(ψ(XG+YH|X)))=0. (10)
Proof. Let ψ′ the indicator of the code generated by H. Since H has dual-
distance d+1, we have that for all z ∈Fn2 , 0<wH(z)≤ d, ψ̂′(z)=0, where
ψ̂′(z)=
∑
z′∈Fn2 ψ
′(z)(−1)z′·z. Now, owing to Lemma 1 in [4], we also know
that for all z∈Fn2 , wH(z)>d◦(ψ), ψ̂(z)=0.
Now, we must prove that Var(E(ψ(XG+YH|X)))=0, that for all x∈Fk2,∑
y∈Fn−k2
ψ(xG+yH) =
∑
z∈Fn2 ψ(xG+z)ψ
′(z) = (ψ⊗ψ′)(xG) is the same,
where ⊗ is the convolution product.
Actually, we can prove more than that, namely that ψ⊗ψ′ is constant on
the full Fn2 . This is equivalent to proving that ψ̂⊗ψ′= ψ̂ψ̂′ is equal to zero
on Fn2 \{0}. Indeed, let z∈Fn2 , z 6=0. If wH(z)>d◦(ψ), then ψ̂(z)=0. And if
wH(z)≤d◦(ψ)≤d, then ψ̂′(z)=0. So, in both cases, we have ψ̂(z)ψ̂′(z)=0. ut
Notice that the function ψ :Fn2→R such that ψ(x)=
∑n−1
i=0 xi2
i, has degree
one. It is sometimes (abusively) referred to as the identity function. Obviously,
if the attacker gets to know ψ(Z), then he can recover Z, hence deduce X by
projection on subspace vector C. But this is not our security hypothesis. Our
result from Theorem 10 (and in particular its Eqn. (10)) is that the inter-class
variance of ψ(Z) knowing X is equal to zero, for all d◦(ψ)≤d.
In Equation (10), the degree of function ψ can be accounted by two reasons:
1. High-degree leakage in y=ϕ◦f, arising from spurious physical interac-
tions within the circuit, and occurring before a leakage can be observed
outside of the circuit boundary. Such high-degree leakage can be caused
by glitches (see Sec. 4), capacitive coupling such as cross-talk, IR drop,
ground/substrate coupling, etc. (refer to [18, Sec. 4.2]);
2. Intentional combination function computed by the attacker, which can be:
multivariate (which involves a product of several shares), or monovariate
(raising to a given power, hence necessarily high-order zero-offset [42]).
As another remark, we notice that, although it is not strictly mandatory,
the randomized variable Z can be manipulated by subwords, a bit like for
classical masking, where the subwords coincide with shares.
Let us give the example of the look-up table, in the case k=8 and n=16.
We know that we can reach 4-th order security [4]. But we can decide not to
12 Sylvain Guilley, Annelie Heuser and Olivier Rioul
manipulate only Z as such, but to cut it into two parts, Z=(ZH,ZL), where
ZH,ZL∈F82. This cut is motivated by the adequation between the masking
scheme and the machine architecture, where maybe the basic register size is
8 bits. Then, we also cut the T-table(s) into two tables, namely TH and TL,
both of 256 bytes. The algorithm 1 allows to evaluate the T-table using bytes
only, i.e., without placing ZH and ZL side-by-side for all data Z.
Input :
– (zH,zL)∈F82×F82
– TH,TL, two tables of size 216 bytes
Output :The result of the lookup (TH[zH×28+zL],TL[zH×28+zL])
1 Initialize z′H∈F82 and z′L∈F82 to zero
2 for h=0 to 28−1 do
3 for l=0 to 28−1 do
4 z′H←z′H⊕TH[h×28+l]∧(h=zH)∧(l=zL)
5 z′L←z′L⊕TL[h×28+l]∧(h=zH)∧(l=zL)
6 end
7 end
8 return (z′H,z′L)
Algorithm 1: S-box evaluation by block, without ever using a 16-bit word
3.5 Illustration for Some Coding-Based Masking Schemes
In the previous section, we have shown with Theorems 9 and 10 that the
two models (bit-level probing and bounded moments) are equivalent, which
motivates to consider the probing model at bit level (as opposed to at word
level, as done in many papers (to cite a few: [16,19]). We give hereafter some
examples of masking with codes at bit-level.
Perfect masking The masks M1, M2, etc. are chosen uniformly in Fk2. We
assume here that k|n. It is possible to see perfect masking as a special case
of ODSM [3], where:
G=
(
Ik 0 0 ... 0
)
and H=


Ik Ik 0 ... 0
Ik 0 Ik ... 0
... 0 0
. . . 0
Ik 0 0 ... Ik

. (11)
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Rotating Substitution-box Masking (RSM [33]) Let us illustrate RSM
on n=8 bits. The mask M is chosen uniformly in:
– the set C0={0x00} for no resistance,
– the set C1={0x00,0xff} for resistance to first-order attacks,
– the set C2, a non-linear code of length 8, size 12 and dual distance d⊥C2=3,
– the set C3, a linear code of length 8, dimension 4 and dual distance d⊥C3=4.
This code is fully described in [15]. It is a self-dual code of parameters [8,4,4].
The case C3 is interesting since there are sixteen masks, hence (in hard-
ware), the sixteen Substitution-boxes (S) of an algorithm such as AES can be
implemented masked. When ϕ=wH and Z=f(T,k∗)=S(T⊕k∗), then the
leakage distributions X=ϕ(Z⊕M) are represented in Fig. 4.
F82=Z1tZ2tZ3, with |Z1|=16, |Z2|=128, |Z3|=112.
=
=
=
6=
=
=
=
6=
Let z be the
sensitive
variable
(z ∈ Fn2 ,
with n = 8)
E[w1H(z ⊕M)]:
E[w2H(z ⊕M)]:
E[w3H(z ⊕M)]:
E[w4H(z ⊕M)]:
4
18
88
480
4
18
88
459
4
18
88
456
0 8 0 08 8
z ∈ Z1 z ∈ Z2 z ∈ Z3Moments:
Fig. 4. Leakage distribution of RSM using M∼U(C3) on n=8 bits
RSM involves a random index, that is the choice of the initial codeword in
Cd, for a protection order of d. This choice can be done in a leak-free manner
by using a one-hot representation. In the case of C3, sixteen such indices can
be selected. The one-hot representation is given in Fig. 5. The random index
is selected at random initially; then, from round to round, it is simply shifted.
Leakage Squeezing (LS) In leakage squeezing, the shares are like for perfect
masking, except that some bijective functions (linear or non-linear) are applied
to them, thereby mixing bits better [17,12,10,13].
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0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 5. Example of one-hot counter (out of 16), used to designate the round index position
Results For the illustration of the bounded moment model, we use for our illus-
trations the Hamming weight leakage model. Notice that any other first-order
leakage model would yield comparable results.
Also, we illustrate the leakage based on two extreme plaintexts, that is
0x00 and 0xff. However, in some situations, these two plaintexts lead to the
same leakage (e.g., for symmetry reasons).
In all the presented schemes, security holds only provided there is no high-
order leakage. Said differently, it is possible to consider that there is a high-order
leakage. For instance, in recap figure 6, the indicated security order is the attack
total order. The total attack order is the sum of multiplicative contribution
from the hardware and the operations carried out by the attacker. That is, poor
hardware which couples bits contributes to facilitates attacks by combining bits.
3.6 Masking and Faults Detection
Codes are also suitable tools when both side-channel leakage must be masked
and faults must be detected. This need is general in cryptography, and has
specific applications when thwarting Hardware Trojan Horses (HTH) [35,34,11].
Indeed, the activation part of a HTH is impeded by masking, whereas the
payload part is caught red-handed by a detection code.
4 Leakage Model and Glitches
The term glitch refers to a (some) non-functional transition(s) occurring in com-
binational logic. They exist because combinational gates are non-synchronizing,
i.e., they evaluate as soon as one input arrive. In terms of hardware description
languages (VHDL, Verilog, etc.), they are modelled as processes where all
inputs belong to the sensitivity list. Thus, for the vast majority of gates with
many inputs, there is the possibility of a race between the inputs. Therefore,
some gates can evaluate several times within one clock period. Actually, the
deeper the combinational gates, the more likely it is that:
– there is a large timing difference between the inputs, thereby generating
new glitches, and
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Z
M1Z ⊕M1
Z ⊕⊕2i=1 Mi
Z ⊕⊕3i=1 Mi
M1
M1
M2
M2 M3
Perfect masking z = 0x00 z = 0xff
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Z
M ∼ U({0x00, 0xff})Z ⊕M
Rotating Substitution-box Masking (RSM) z = 0x00 z = 0xff
Z ⊕M
Z ⊕M
M ∼ U(C2), with d⊥C2 = 3
M ∼ U(C3), with d⊥C3 = 4
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Z
Z ⊕M
Leakage Squeezing (LS) z = 0x00 z = 0xff
Z ⊕M
Z ⊕M
F1(M)
F2(M)
F3(M)
F1 = Id : z ∈ F82 → z ∈ F82
etc. continues up to order 6
...
Fig. 6. Security level of several masking schemes. The order d=1,2,3,4 corresponds both to
the number of probes (see Fig. 1(a)) used by the attacker and to the moment of leakage
when the attacker uses an integrating probe (see Fig. 1(b))
– some input is already the output of a glitching gate, thereby amplifying
the number of glitches.
It is known that glitches can defeat masking schemes [30,29,31]. Some masking
schemes which somehow tolerate [21,36,40,22] or avoid glitches [28,32] have
been put forward. However, the real negative effect of glitches on security is
usually perceived in a qualitative manner.
Therefore, we would like to account quantitatively for the effect of glitches.
Let us start by an illustrative example1, provided in Fig. 7. The upper part of
this figure represents a pipeline, where some combinational gates (AND gates
represented by and XOR gate represented by ) form a partial netlist
between two barriers of flip-flops (DFF gates represented by ). For the sake
1 Leakage of combinational gates arises from their transitions, that is it actually depends
both on their initial and final states. In order to make the two use-cases presented in
Fig. 7 and 8 simple to understand, we initialize the netlists at an all-zero state, thence
we can reason only on the final values.
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of this explanation, all the gates are assumed to have the same propagation
time, namely 1 ns. The lower part of this figure gives the chronograms of the
execution of this netlist, when initially all signals are set to zero. It appears
that, owing to the difference of paths between the two inputs of the final XOR
gate, this gate generates a glitch, highlighted with symbol , which lasts
3 ns, between time 1 and 4 ns within the depicted clock period. The condition
for this glitch to appear is the following: x1∧x2∧x3∧x4. This means that
this glitch is a 4th-order leakage. So, if the masking scheme is only 3rd-order
resistant, the setup of Fig. 7 would generate a glitch which compromises the
security in a 1st-order side-channel attack. That is, the circuit itself contributes
to the attack, in combining the bits on behalf of the attacker.
y1
y2
y3
y4
x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
y0
time0 ns 1 ns 2 ns 3 ns 4 ns
x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
y0
Fig. 7. Example of 4th-order glitch occurring upon 4th-order conjunction
∧i=4
i=1xi
Assume now a setup slightly more simple than that of Fig. 7, where there
is only one AND gate behind the second input of the XOR gate. However, we
assume such pattern is present twice, once computing y0=x0⊕(x1∧x2), and
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another time computing y5=x5⊕(x4∧x3). Then, in this case depicted in Fig. 8,
the leakage incurred by the glitches at the output of the XOR gates would only
combine two bits amongst the xi (namely x1 & x2, and x3 & x4). Therefore,
it suffices for the attacker to conduct a 2nd-order attack on the glitchy traces
to succeed a 2×2=4th order attack on the masking scheme. The circuit and
the attacker collaborate in the objective of realizing a 4th-order attack: half
of the combination is carried out by the circuit ((x1∧x2) and (x3∧x4)), while
the other half is left remaining to the attacker. Indeed, by raising the traces
to the second power, the attacker obtains a term (x1∧x2)×(x3∧x4), which
coincides with the leakage condition of Fig. 7, that is
∧i=4
i=1xi.
To conclude on the leakage model complexification, we underline that it
has a negative impact on two situations:
– on low-entropy masking schemes, where the individual shares are not
protected at the maximum order (see for instance RSM in Sec. 3.5), and
– on any masking schemes, where shares interact between themselves by
some combinational logic.
In those two cases, a great care must be taken; tools as that described in [18]
can help check the design is secure (or not).
5 Conclusion
Throughout this paper, we have seen how coding and side-channel analysis
can benefit one from another, for attack as well as for protection.
This is a nice example of cross fertilization between disciplines, in which
Claude Carlet played a decisive role. Thanks to you, Claude!
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A SNR in the Presence of First-Order Masking
Let us consider a first-order masking scheme [1]. By design, a first-order side-
channel attack fails. However, a second-order side-channel attack, combining
two samples, can succeed. The setup is the following: the leakage is:
(
X1
X2
)
=
(
α1Y
?
1
α2Y
?
2
)
+
(
N1
N2
)
,
where:
– N1∼N (0,σ21) and N2∼N (0,σ22) are two independent noise sources,
– α1 and α2 are the amount of leakage,
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– Y ?1 and Y ?2 are leakage functions (assumed normalized, that is E(Y ?i )=0
and Var(Y ?i )=1, for i∈{1,2}).
In the Boolean masking where the attacker target the pair (mask, masked
substitution box S), the leakage model is:
– Y1= 2√n
(
wH(S(T⊕k)⊕M)− n2
)
=− 1√
n
∑n
b=1(−1)Sb(T⊕k)⊕Mb and
– Y2= 2√n
(
wH(M)− n2
)
=− 1√
n
∑n
b=1(−1)Mb.
The notation Mb means bit b∈{1,...,n} in bitvector M∈Fn2 .
As the masking is first-order perfect, we indeed have that E(Yi|T=t) does
not depend on the key, for each share i∈{1,2}. However, the attacker is inclined
to combine the two leakages by a centered product, since the expectation of
this combination Yc=Y1Y2 depends on the key, despite the masking with the
uniform M∼U(Fn2). Precisely, let t∈Fn2 one realization of T . We have that:
E(Yc|T=t)=
1
2n
∑
m∈Fn2
1
n
∑
b,b′
(−1)Sb(T⊕k)⊕mb⊕mb′
=
1
n2n
∑
m∈Fn2
∑
b
(−1)Sb(T⊕k) (because m is uniform on Fn2)
=− 1
2
√
n
(
wH(S(T⊕k))−
n
2
)
, (12)
which happens to be proportional to the leakage model of the substitution box
when the masking is disabled (M=0). Indeed, one can derive from Eqn. (12)
that:
E(Yc|T=t)=−
1
2
√
n
E(Y1|T=t,M=0).
The second-order attack thus consists in applying the regular correlation
power analysis (CPA [2]):
– targeting Xc=X1X2 instead of X1 or X2,
– using as leakage model E(Yc|T), where we recall that Yc=Y1Y2 [39].
Thus, the new leakage to analyse is:
Xc=X1X2=(α1Y
?
1 +N1)(α2Y
?
2 +N2)
=α1α2Y
?
1 Y
?
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
signal
+α1Y
?
1 N2+α2Y
?
2 N1+N1N2︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
.
Indeed, the term Y ?1 Y ?2 conditionally to the known plaintext T depends on
the key (recall Eqn. (12)), whereas the other terms α1Y ?1 N2+α2Y ?2 N1+N1N2
do not.
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Therefore, the SNR in the case of the second-order attack is:
SNR(2o)=
Var(α1α2Y
?
1 Y
?
2 )
Var(α1Y ?1 N2+α2Y
?
2 N1+N1N2)
. (13)
Proposition 11. The SNR in the case of the second-order attack is:
SNR(2o)=
SNR1·SNR2
1+SNR1+SNR2
,
where SNRi=α2i /σ
2
i for i∈{1,2}.
Proof. We have:
ET,M(Y ?1 Y ?2 )=
1
22n
∑
t∈Fn2 ,m∈Fn2
Y ?1 Y
?
2
=
1
22n
(
2√
n
)2∑
m
(
wH(m)−
n
2
)∑
t
(
wH(S(t⊕k?)⊕m)−
n
2
)
=
1
22n
(
2√
n
)2∑
m
(
wH(m)−
n
2
)∑
z
(
wH(z)−
n
2
)
(14)
=0×0=0.
At line (14), we used the fact that S is a bijection of Fn2 (as is SubBytes in
AES [37]).
Besides, we also have:
ET,M
(
(Y ?1 Y
?
2 )
2
)
=
1
22n
∑
t∈Fn2 ,m∈Fn2
(Y ?1 )
2(Y ?2 )
2
=
1
22n
(
2√
n
)4∑
m
(
wH(m)−
n
2
)2∑
t
(
wH(S(t⊕k?)⊕m)−
n
2
)2
=
1
22n
(
2√
n
)4∑
m
(
wH(m)−
n
2
)2∑
z
(
wH(z)−
n
2
)2
(15)
=1×1=1 (as per the normalization of Y ?1 and Y ?2 ).
Therefore, the variance of the signal is equal to α21α22.
Regarding the noise part, we have:
E(α1Y ?1 N2+α2Y ?2 N1+N1N2)=0,
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by independence between N1, N2 and Y ?i for i∈{1,2}. We also have:
Var(α1Y
?
1 N2+α2Y
?
2 N1+N1N2)=E
(
(α1Y
?
1 N2+α2Y
?
2 N1+N1N2)
2
)
−0
=α21σ
2
2+α
2
2σ
2
1+σ
2
1σ
2
2.
As a result, we have:
SNR(2o)=
α21α
2
2
α21σ
2
2+α
2
2σ
2
1+σ
2
1σ
2
2
=
SNR1·SNR2
1+SNR1+SNR2
.
ut
Corollary 12 (Limit of SNR(2o) in the presence of large noise).When
the noise is large, that is SNRi1 for i∈{1,2}, then
SNR(2o)≈SNR1·SNR2≈SNR2 (if SNR1≈SNR2=SNR). (16)
Proof. Immediate first-order simplification of SNR(2o) as given in Proposi-
tion 11. ut
